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Abstract  
The paper investigates the determinants of Italian pension funds’ exposure to the domestic sovereign bonds 
through a panel analysis, over the time-period 2008-2014, on a sample of 70 funds and 230 investment lines. We 
investigate the drivers on sovereign home bias along two main explicative arrows: the familiarity theory, and the 
opportunity set theory. Results indicate that both factors are significant. However, from a quantitative point of 
view, the main determinant is the presence of restrictions in the investment mandate. The existence of a 
minimum guaranteed return increases on average by 11 per cent the weight of the Italian sovereign bonds on the 
European sovereign portfolio, while extending the investment spectrum outside Europe determines a decrease of 
4.5 per cent on average. This finding suggests that exposures to the domestic-sovereign risk of Italian pension 
funds would probably reduce after specific mandate restrictions have loosened. Since sovereign home bias 
translates into concentration risk, it may weaken the soundness of the private pension pillar in case the Italian 
T-bonds suffer from a significant price reduction. Regulators should pay close attention to this issue to enhance 
the stability of the Italian pension fund industry, considering that such a large sovereign home bias could 
simultaneously undermine the private and public pension payments. 
Keywords: foreign managers, home bias, investment mandate, pension funds, sovereign risk exposure 
1. Introduction 
Sovereign risk has currently become a sensitive topic, particularly in Europe, since the European sovereign debt 
crisis reminded that sovereigns are not exactly risk-free and can actually default.  
During the crisis, spreads between core and peripheral countries opened up, offering the market a safe harbour to 
refuge, and at the same time risky investment opportunities. Nevertheless, it is known that, besides pure financial 
aspects and market expectations, investors, especially institutional, normally hold large amounts of their national 
public debt for several other reasons including the social role they play in supporting domestic government 
financial needs. As a consequence, financial intermediaries tend to be over exposed towards their national bonds 
and then suffer the so-called sovereign home bias. This is a quite widespread phenomenon around the world, and 
in times of crisis, it can foster the contagion between sovereigns and financial systems. For this reasons 
sovereign risk is currently under the spotlight to the extent that it might lose its favourable condition of risk-free 
asset and thus zero-risk weight with enormous potential impacts on financial intermediaries’ capitalisation and 
bond market prices. 
The significance of this topic calls for careful investigations, especially in the European countries with low 
creditworthiness and for an extension of the analysis beyond the banking system, which is, for the time being, 
the main financial sector under the spotlight (Eiopa, 2016, for insurers and pension funds). The pension fund 
industry in Italy represents a particularly interesting case study to analyse the sovereign home bias. In fact, since 
the Italian sovereign bonds are the most traded and liquid in Europe, and they offer relative interesting yields in 
times of low interest rates (Battistini et al, 2013; Bijlsma and Vermeulen, 2015; Dull et al, 2015), the incentive 
for fund managers to overweight the exposure towards home sovereign debt are particularly strong. Under this 
point of view Italy represents a sort of “natural experiment” which makes the phenomenon easier to observe and 
analyse compared to other markets.  
Looking at the Italian pension funds, the Italian Supervisory Authority COVIP’s annual report 2015 shows that 
30 per cent of overall pension fund assets are invested in domestic Treasury bonds. This percentage rises up to 
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40-50 per cent, depending on the fund’s nature, if we only consider the fixed income portfolio. The Italian bond 
market itself is unbalanced. Italy is the largest issuer of public debt securities in Europe. Thus, domestic 
government bonds dominate the market, covering 65 per cent of total issues, and are far more liquid than large 
corporate bonds, including financials. Moreover, Italy is currently evaluated BBB, due to persistent weak 
economic fundamentals, high public debt, high unemployment rate, high fiscal pressure and lack of 
competitiveness. Being at the border between investment and speculative grade, it is highly likely that a small 
increase in risk perception could lead to fire sales of Italian Treasury bonds and big drops in their market values. 
Considering that pension funds evaluate their assets at market price, large negative price movements in domestic 
sovereign bonds might compromise the performance and benefits offered by the whole pension fund sector. 
Solvency problems could even occur for lines that offer a minimum return guarantee and are obliged to keep 
their promises to investors.  
Therefore, in this paper we empirically analyse the determinants of sovereign home bias in Italian pension funds. 
Our hypothesis is that the unbalanced allocation towards Italian Treasury bonds is mainly driven by two factors: 
the opportunity set defined by the investment mandates and the nationality of the investment firm. In fact, on one 
side, restricted boundaries set by the investment mandates shrink the type of asset classes and geographical areas, 
especially in pension fund lines with low risk profile, and force fund managers to shift their investment 
allocations towards a greater portion of domestic sovereign bonds. On the other side, the fund managers’ 
nationality, which means better information about their own country and familiarity with domestic markets and 
instruments, could contribute to reduce diversification opportunities and benefits. Instead, we do not expect 
structural features of pension funds to explain their sovereign home bias attitude, given a kind of homogeneity in 
their portfolio management, as shown in a previous paper (De Vincentiis et al, 2016). 
The first issue we need to address is how to measure the bias itself. The easiest way is to weight the domestic 
sovereign bond allocation on the overall portfolio invested in EU sovereign bonds. We then introduce another 
indicator of domestic sovereign bias that allow us to better isolate the effect of managers’ allocation decisions 
and any other kind of external constraint. Following Manna et al. (2016), we create a neutral sovereign portfolio, 
where each country weights only according to the amount of its public debt with respect to the total EU public 
debts. Therefore, the sovereign home bias is evaluated comparing the allocation of each pension fund of our 
sample with the neutral portfolio.  
We then empirically test out hypothesis conducting an in-depth analysis across different investment lines and 
different periods. Our results support the hypothesis that restrictions on investment mandates increase the 
domestic sovereign bias, while exhibit a weaker link than expected with the presence of foreign portfolio 
managers.  
Our results also suggest that removing some restrictions to the investment mandates – like in most of the 
European countries – and promoting a more international competition among asset management firms might lead 
to a better portfolio diversification and an overall risk reduction. In fact, sovereign home bias translates into 
concentration risk and in case the country suffers again from national or global financial turbulence, such asset 
allocation will further weaken the soundness of the private pension pillar exactly when it should work as 
parachute against the fall of the public pension system. 
We trust that these results are important to shed some lights on these specialised but very important financial 
intermediaries that, given their large asset allocation in sovereign debt, are likely to be significantly affected by 
bond markets movements or specific measures on sovereign credit risk taken by regulators at global level (ESRB, 
2015).  
As far as we know, our work is the first paper on sovereign home bias in pension funds.  
Surprisingly, despite the extensive literature on home bias, very few studies have researched the unexplored 
territory of pension funds, and none have specifically analysed the sovereign home bias. The most recent work to 
date that is closest to our analysis is conducted by Lippi (2016), who investigates the presence of country home 
bias in Italian occupational pension funds. He finds that the phenomenon is persistent over time and more 
pronounced when the risk profile is lower and the fund manager domestic. Only another two papers belong to 
this stream of literature, and both of them refer to a specific country. Lelyveld et al. (2010) provides empirical 
evidence on domestic bias in Dutch pension fund asset allocation, mainly driven by fund inexperience, measured 
in terms of operational age, and risk-aversion attitudes that persuade to invest in more familiar markets during 
periods of high volatility or financial crisis. Karlsson and Norden (2007) investigate the home bias in Swedish 
individual pension plans adopting a different point of view. They test the relationship between the demographic 
and socioeconomic features of adherents and the likelihood of home bias in order to identify a typical 
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home-biased candidate.  
Enlarging the perimeter to all types of institutional and individual investors, the scientific production on home 
bias is rich and highly varied.  Home bias is an old worldwide phenomenon and in the course of time many 
researchers have offered their contribution to explain the tendency to overweight domestic holdings at the 
expenses of foreign securities, especially in the fixed income portfolios. In brief, there are mainly two types of 
explanations, namely market constrictions and investor behaviour. As for the first category, many factors may 
reduce returns from investing abroad or limit investors’ capability to hold foreign assets transaction costs 
(Glassman and Riddick, 2001; Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013), differences in tax treatment, limits on cross-border 
investment (French and Poterba, 1991), real exchange rate (Fidora et al., 2006), and market transparency (Giofrè, 
2013). But, as French and Poterba say, such constraints are not binding and appear unable to fully explain limited 
international diversification. This implies that home bias is primarily the result of investor behaviour. Tesar and 
Werner (1995), Coval and Moskovitz (1999), Campbell and Kraussel (2007) and Dziuda and Mondria (2012)) 
demonstrate that asymmetric information is the main ingredient of domestic bias. Asymmetric information 
produces the familiarity theory (Chan et al., 2005; McQueen and Stenkrona, 2012; Pool et al., 2012), the 
optimism or overconfidence theory (Suh, 2005) and the geographic proximity theory (Campell and Kraüssl, 
2007; Giofrè, 2013; Coval and Moskovitz, 1999), which explain why investors consistently favour domestic 
securities. 
In conclusion, the major strengths of our work are the following: 
− It is the first analysis that focuses on exposure to sovereign risk in the pension fund sector, contributing to 
the current debate on sovereign risk prudential treatment by looking at intermediaries different from banks; 
− It is the first analysis that empirically tests the relationship between fund managers’ mandate perimeter and 
portfolio diversification-bias; 
− It offers a new contribution to the previous specific literature on the assessment of foreign managers, 
introducing new indicators that more precisely capture the role and incidence of foreign fund managers with 
respect to domestic fund managers. 
2. Sample Description and Methodology 
Our analysis is based on a proprietary database of accounting and structural information concerning both closed 
(occupational) and open pension funds operating in Italy. Starting from the complete list of pension funds 
available at the website of the Commission supervising the sector (Commissione di Vigilanza sui Fondi Pensione 
– COVIP), we built a dataset based on information extracted from financial statements, statutes and informative 
notes for the period 2008-2014, considering all investment lines, both with and without a minimum return 
guarantee. The data summarised in Table 1 show that our sample coverage of the universe in analysis is more 
than satisfactory.  
 
Table 1. Sample coverage – Number of investment lines and assets under management  
All investment lines Sample Total % coverage
No. funds 70 94 74.47 
Closed funds 35 38 92.11 
Open funds 35 56 62.50 
No. of lines 230 361 63.71 
Closed funds 86 108 79.63 
Open funds 144 253 56.92 
Net asset value 38 54 71.30 
Closed funds 33 40 83.37 
Open funds 5 14 37.08 
Guaranteed lines Sample Total % coverage
No. of lines 81 111 72.97 
Closed funds 35 36 97.22 
Open funds 46 75 61.33 
Net asset value 7 8 91.00 
Closed funds 6 6 99.75 
Open funds 1,5 2 67.97 
Note. The Table compares the sample used for the analysis of the paper to the universe of pension funds operating in Italy. The first section 
includes information on the number of pension funds; the total count of investment lines, differentiated by risk level and asset allocation 
limits, offered by the pension funds; the net asset value of the funds recorded in the balance sheet. The second section of the Table focus on 
the number and net asset value of guaranteed investment lines, offering a minimum return to adherents. All data refer to 31 December 2014 
and are split for closed (occupational) funds and open funds.  
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The sample includes 70 pension funds, subdivided into 230 investment lines. The database represents 63.71 per 
cent of the total in terms of investment lines count, whereas the coverage increases to 71.30 per cent when we 
look at the amount of assets under management (AUM). The sample represents a wider share of the universe in 
the sub-sector of the guaranteed lines, which is particularly interesting for our research question (see second 
section of Table 1). In this case, the sample includes above 70 per cent of the lines and 91 per cent of the net 
asset value.  
Table 2 focuses on the distribution of investment lines by level of risk declared by the fund informative note. 
Data show that the sample is well balanced across this dimension with only a slight over-representation of the 
“low risk” class due to the presence of the guaranteed funds that often belong to this segment.   
 
Table 2. Sample distribution by level of risk of the asset management  
Level of risk Number of lines In % 
Low 69 30.00 
Medium-Low 32 13.91 
Medium 49 21.30 
Medium-High 42 18.26 
High 33 14.35 
Na (*) 5 2.17 
Total 230 100.00 
(*) Data not available. 
Note. The Table details the distribution of the investment lines included in the sample by risk level of the asset allocation. The classification 
refers to the level of the risk declared by the pension fund in the Informative notes to investors. 
 
We want to explore the size of domestic sovereign exposure as a function of three main sets of determinants, 
described in detail in Table 3.  
First, we introduce a set of regressors related to the composition and diversification of the asset management 
team. We consider the total number of intermediaries in charge of asset management, expecting a negative 
association with the domestic sovereign bias. A more numerous investment team could in fact include specialised 
intermediaries and thus increase diversification into particular sectors or market segments. We also consider the 
presence of foreign managers and the share of assets under management they are in charge of. In line with a 
strong stream of literature (Chan et al, 2005; McQueen and Stenkrona, 2012; Pool and al., 2012), fund managers 
are prone to choose domestic bonds, since they know their market better (familiarity theory) and are more 
confident in their choices (information theory). Therefore, we expect pension funds where foreign intermediaries 
manage a larger share of the investment portfolio to have a lower degree of domestic sovereign exposure. It is 
important to specify that we take into consideration the nationality of the investment firm in charge of portfolio 
management and not the nationality of the physical person in charge of the job. This methodological choice 
differentiates our work from others on similar topics. Considering the nationality of the investment firm, we can 
indirectly capture with this variable, alongside familiarity problems, also the weaker moral suasion to buy home 
sovereign bonds that can be exerted on non-domestic financial intermediaries by the national Treasury. As far as 
the role of foreign managers is concerned, our work contributes to existing literature by exploring the issue more 
in depth. To our knowledge, only Lippi (2016) deals with this issue for pension funds. Lippi, however, applies a 
set of dummies that overlook the share of assets actually managed by foreign intermediaries. We observe the 
presence of foreign managers alongside other Italian managers, and we note that, in several cases, the share of 
assets given to foreign managers is quite small, precisely 25 per cent on average and the median of the 
distribution is zero (see Table 3). In order to better represent the actual weight of foreign intermediaries inside 
the management pool of the pension fund, we consider two variables, namely the number of foreign managers to 
the total number of managers (No_foreign_managers), and the share of AUM managed by foreign managers 
(Relevance_foreign_managers).  
Secondly, we use a few independent variables that account for the rigidity of the investment mandate to asset 
managers. We hypothesize that a narrower investment mandate can induce the fund manager to higher sovereign 
exposure, since the opportunities set available is more restricted (He and Xoing, 2013; Lippi, 2016). Especially 
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in the case of a country, like Italy, where sovereign bonds offer interesting yields due to the high weight of public 
debt, fund managers in search for returns could boost sovereign exposure when potential alternatives are 
precluded by the mandate, at the expense of sound risk diversification (Battistini et al., 2013). Thus, we expect 
all limitations to the investable domain to be associated with a greater home sovereign bias. The main constraints 
considered include the geographical extension of the area where securities can be chosen, the maximum amount 
of equity allowed in the asset allocation by the Statute of the fund and the presence of a minimum return 
guarantee. For the guaranteed lines, in particular, we expect domestic sovereign exposure to be heavier when the 
commitment to participants in terms of minimum return level becomes broader. A most controversial aspect is 
the effect of the extension of events covered by the guarantee. A wider commitment could increase the home bias 
representing a further rigidity of the investment mandate. On the other side, the inclusion of the voluntary change 
of pension funds among the events covered by the guarantee could push managers to keep more liquidity as a 
precautionary cushion, thus decreasing the weight of sovereign bonds on total assets. The expected sign of the 
variable is consequently uncertain. 
Finally, the third set of regressors controls the structural features of the fund that could have an impact of asset 
allocation, like the size of assets under management, the juridical status (closed vs. open funds) and the amount 
of cash inflow/outflow on an annual basis for contributions received/benefits paid. Among these variables, the 
most discussed in literature is the size that we measure through the net asset value logarithm. The evidence of 
previous studies is mixed. Some authors find negative relations between size and home bias, explaining the 
phenomenon with the greater diversification opportunities offered by larger assets under management (Ni 2009, 
Dyck and Pomorski, 2011). On the contrary, Hau and Ray (2008) find a strong, though counter-intuitive, positive 
association. This mixed evidence explains the uncertain sign reported in Table 3.   
 
Table 3. Explanatory variables: definitive, expected sign and descriptive statistics 
Variables Description Exp. 
Sign 
Mean Median Std Dev. Max Min Obs
Inv_area Dummy = 1 if the investment area 
extends to all OECD countries. 
- 0.75 1 0.43 1 0 1.40 
Max_Equity Maximum share of equity 
investment resulting from the 
investment mandate. 
- 0.37 0.35 0.29 1 0 1.11 
Guarantee Dummy = 1 if there is a minimum 
guaranteed return. 
+ 0.36 0 0.48 1 0 1.43 
Guarantee_type Dummy = 1 if the minimum 
guaranteed return is greater than a 
capital guarantee. 
+ 0.67 1 0.47 1 0 518 
Discretional_ 
choice 
Dummy = 1 if the guarantee 
operates in case of voluntary 
changes of fund or investment line. 
+ 0.29 0 0.46 1 0 511 
No_managers Number of investment firms in 
charge of portfolio management.
- 1.45 1.11 0.25 9 1 1.42 
No_foreign_ 
managers 
Number of foreign investment firms 
as a percentage of total managers. 




Assets under management (AUM) 
by foreign investment firms to total 
AUM. 
- 0.25 0 0.41 1 0 1.31 
Fund_type Dummy = 1 for closed funds. + 0.40 0 0.49 1.00 0 1.4
Nav Natural logarithm of the fund’s 
NAV. 
-/+ 16.97 17 1.88 22.29 10.02 1.42 
Net_ 
contribution 
Annual net contribution to NAV. - 0.26 0.20 0.210 2.86 -1.36 1.40 
Benefits Annual pension benefits to NAV. + 0.012 0.006 0.020 0.33 0 1.40 
Note. The Table presents a few descriptive statistics on the independent variables used in the multivariate analysis. For each variable column 
2 summarises the computation methodology and column 3 indicates the expected sign on the basis of the theoretical explanations and 
assumptions explained in the text. The columns from 4 to 9 present the usual descriptive statistics for each variable i.e. the mean and median 
values, the standard deviation, the maximum and minimum values recorded in the entire sample (2008-2014) and the number of available 
observations.   
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As already explained in the previous paragraph, we measure the size of the domestic sovereign exposure for each 
investment line using two alternative dependent variables. The first one represents the share of sovereign bond 
portfolio invested in Italian Treasury bonds (Y1). The other variable compares the actual weight of Italian 
sovereign exposure to the relative share of Italian public debt over the total outstanding of European sovereign 
bonds on a yearly basis (Y2): 
ܻ(2) =  ܫܶ ܵ݋ݒ ܤ݋݊݀ݏܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܵ݋ݒ ܤ݋݊݀ݏி௨௡ௗ (௜);௒௘௔௥(௧) −  
ܫݐ݈ܽ݅ܽ݊ ܵ݋ݒ ܤ݋݊݀ݏ ܱݑݐ
 ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊ ܵ݋ݒ ܤ݋݊݀ݏ ܱݑݐ௒௘௔௥ (௧)
 
Where: 
IT Sov Bonds: total amount of Italian sovereign bonds held by fund (i) at the end of year (t); 
Total Sov Bonds: total amount of sovereign bonds held by fund (i) an the end of year (t); 
Italian Sov Bons Out: total outstanding sovereign bonds issued by Italian Treasury at the end of year (t); 
European Sov Bonds Out: total outstanding of sovereign bonds issued by European countries at the end of year 
(t). 
This latter variable allows us to estimate how much over- or under- represented is Italian sovereign risk in the 
investment portfolio of each investment line, using as a benchmark a “neutral” asset allocation, which simply 
mirrors the current structure of European sovereign market. 
Table 4, 5 and 6 provide some univariate statistics concerning our two dependent variables considering the main 
explicative factors described above.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on the share of domestic sovereign bonds  
 Entire sample Guaranteed lines
Y(1): Share of Italian sovereign bonds on UE sovereign exposure 
Mean  0.5431 0.6474 
Median 0.5056 0.6333 
Standard deviation 0.3040 0.2731 
Max 1 1 
Min 0 0 
N. Obs. 1426 519 
Mean difference (All - Guaranteed) -0.1043***  
Y(2): Y(1) - Share of Italian debt on total UE area sovereign debt 
Mean  0.3571 0.4620 
Median 0.355 0.4447 
Standard deviation 0.3035 0.2723 
Max 0.8240 0.8240 
Min -0.2108 -0.2108 
N. Obs. 1414 518 
Mean difference (All - Guaranteed) -0.1049***  
Note. The Table presents a few descriptive statistics on the dependent variables: Y(1) = ratio between the value of Italian sovereign bonds 
and the total value of UE sovereign bonds in the portfolio of the fund. The ratio is computed for each investment line and for each year, 
based on the data provided by the asset side of the fund’s balance sheet; Y(2) = difference between Y(1) variable and the ratio of the total 
amount of sovereign bonds issued by the Italian State on the total amount of sovereign bonds issued by all countries belonging to the EU. 
The data on the total amount of sovereign debt, at the end of each year, are published by Eurostat. For each variable the table details a few 
usual descriptive statistics i.e. the mean and median values, the standard deviation, the maximum and minimum values recorded in the entire 
sample (2008-2014) and the number of available observations.  Column 2 and 3 present the data respectively for the entire sample and for 
the subsample of investment lines offering to participants a minimum guaranteed return. The last row of each section, devoted to each of the 
three dependent variables, reports the mean difference between the entire sample and the guaranteed lines, together with an indication of its 
statistical significance: * = significant at 10% two-tailed confidence level; ** = significant at 5% two-tailed confidence level; *** = 
significant at 1% two-tailed confidence level. 
 
Starting from Table 4, we can first observe that the exposure to domestic Treasury bonds is substantial for Italian 
pension funds, being on average 54.31 per cent of total sovereign portfolio. This weight is much higher than it 
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should be in a neutral portfolio allocation. The mean over-exposure compared amounts to 35.71 per cent. The 
share of domestic sovereign bonds is even more significant in the subsample of guaranteed lines that normally 
have narrow investment mandates and very conservative portfolio allocation (De Vincentiis et al., 2016). In this 
case, in fact, the average weight of Italian Treasury bonds is 64.74 per cent and the mean over-exposure rises to 
46.20. These data clearly indicate that sovereign portfolio allocation is substantially distorted towards domestic 
public debt. 
In Table 5 we can observe the average share of domestic sovereign exposure as a function of two core features of 
the investment mandate, namely the maximum amount of equity allowed in the asset allocation and the 
geographical extension of the investment spectrum, with particular reference to the possibility of buying 
securities outside Europe. The Table also reports the mean level of our two dependent variables by risk level of 
the investment line, as declared in the fund Statute, both for the entire sample and the subsample of guaranteed 
compartments. The data confirm once again the greater domestic sovereign exposure that characterises the 
investment lines with a minimum return guarantee. Furthermore, we can observe how the presence of stricter 
constraints in the investment mandate are associated with a higher degree of home sovereign exposure and 
over-exposure compared to a neutral portfolio. Indeed, funds who can invest only in the European area have on 
average a higher share of domestic securities in their sovereign portfolios, compared to the investment lines that 
are not geographically constrained. The difference in the mean values of the dependent variables is highly 
significant from a statistical point of view. Similarly, the funds that can invest less than 25 per cent in equities 
tend to overweight their domestic sovereign exposure. In this case the evidence is somewhat weaker, but the sign 
of the mean difference is consistent with our expectations. The domestic sovereign exposure and over-exposure 
is negatively correlated to the risk level of the investment line. This evidence is coherent with the weaker 
investment constraints that normally characterise the riskier compartments of pension funds.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics on the share of domestic sovereign bonds by type of investment mandate (values in 
percentage) 
 Entire sample Guaranteed lines 
Y(1): Share of Italian sovereign bonds on UE sovereign exposure  
 Mean  Obs Mean  Obs 
Only Europe 0.6472 349 0.6778 263 
All world 0.5077 1053 0.6207 233 
Max equity <25% 0.6193 457 0.6575 337 
Max equity >25% 0.4923 658 0.6209 110 
Low and medium-low risk 0.6012 614 0.6491 424 
Medium-high and high risk 0.5093 435 0.6322 93 
Y(2): Y(1) - Share of Italian debt on total UE area sovereign debt   
 Mean  Obs Mean  Obs 
Only Europe 0.4600 349 0.4908 263 
All world 0.3220 1053 0.4373 233 
Max equity <25% 0.4338 457 0.4723 337 
Max equity >25% 0.3061 658 0.4350 110 
Low and medium-low risk 0.4156 614 0.4641 424 
Medium-high and high risk 0.3227 435 0.4452 93 
Note. The Table presents the mean values of the two dependent variables (computed as described in Table 4) for different subsamples of 
observations defined as follows: Only Europe: Investment lines in which the asset manager cannot buy securities negotiated outside the 
European Union; All world: investment lines in which the asset manager is not geographically constrained in portfolio composition; Max 
equity < 25%: investment lines in which the asset manager cannot increase the amount of equity securities above the limit of 25% of total 
portfolio value; Max equity < 25%: investment lines in which the asset manager can increase the amount of equities above the limit of 25% 
of portfolio value; Low and medium-low risk: investment lines that are characterised by low or medium-low level of risk according to what 
declared by the Informative note distributed to investors; Medium-high and high risk: investment lines that are characterised by medium-high 
or high level of risk according to what declared by the Informative note distributed to investors. Column 2 and 3 detail the mean value and 
the number of observations for each subsample. Column 4 and 5 present the mean value and the number of observations restricting further 
the perimeter to the investment lines offering a minimum return to investors alongside the restrictions described above. 
 
Table 6 offers a time distribution of the domestic sovereign exposure. The share of domestic sovereign bond in 
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portfolio increases until 2010 and then slightly reduces its magnitude. Two interacting factors can explain this 
reduction. On one hand, during the European sovereign debt crisis, the Italian T-bonds suffered from a 
significant price reduction, thus reducing their weight on the market value of the investment portfolio recorded at 
year-end in the balance sheet of the pension funds. On the other hand, the same crisis may have acted as a strong 
reminder of sovereign risk, pushing investment manager to reconsider their portfolio allocation and increase 
diversification. However, the data in Table 6 show that those funds that can invest only in Europe experienced a 
new growth in the sovereign home bias in 2014. In the empirical analysis the empirical evidence shown in Table 
6 is captured by the fixed time effects.  
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics on the share of domestic sovereign bonds by year and type of investment mandate 
(values in percentage)  
Y(1): Share of Italian sovereign bonds on total sovereign exposure 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Whole sample 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.49 
Only Europe 0.55 0.68 0.74 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.67 
All world 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.46 
Low and medium-low risk 0.59 0.66 0.68 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.55 
medium-high and high risk 0.57 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.48 0.42 
Y(2): Y(1) - Share of Italian debt on total UE area sovereign debt 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Whole sample 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.31 
Only Europe 0.34 0.49 0.55 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.49 
All world 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.28 
Low and medium-low risk 0.39 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.39 0.38 0.37 
medium-high and high risk 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.30 0.24 
Note. The Table presents the mean values of the two dependent variables by year on subsamples of observations defined according to the 
criteria detailed in Table 5. 
 
To conclude our sample description, Table 7 analyses the other potential driver of domestic sovereign bias i.e. 
the composition and diversification of the pension fund’s pool of asset managers. First, we can note the strong 
negative correlation between the total number of intermediaries involved in the portfolio management and the 
degree of sovereign domestic exposure. When the management team is more numerous, it is more likely that 
specialised intermediaries may be involved, thus enhancing portfolio diversification. A strong negative relation is 
also evident between the domestic sovereign bias and the weight of foreign intermediaries in the asset 
management team. This is true both when we look at the number of foreign managers and at the share of 
portfolio under their responsibility.  
 
Table 7. Composition of the asset management team (values in percentage) 
  Mean Y(1) Mean Y(2) 
Total number of fund managers 
1,00 0.5589 0.3728 
2,00 0.5383 0.3531 
3,00 0.4498 0.2634 
4,00 0.4884 0.3004 
5,00 0.4384 0.2542 
>5 0.3389 0.1562 
N. of foreign managers (in %) 
0% 0.5998 0.4202 
Between 0 and 50% 0.4939 0.3082 
Greater than 50% 0.4186 0.2340 
% of AUM managed by foreign managers 
0% 0.6012 0.3963 
Between 0 and 50% 0.4508 0.2663 
Greater than 50% 0.4113 0.2265 
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Note. The Table presents the mean values of the two dependent variables by year on subsamples of observations defined as follows: Total 
number of fund managers: number of financial intermediaries involved in the asset management of each investment line; Number of foreign 
managers in percentage: percentage of the financial intermediaries involved in the asset management whose headquarter is not located in 
Italy; Percentage of AUM managed by foreign managers: quota of each investment line’s portfolio that is managed by a financial 
intermediary whose headquarter is not located in Italy. Univariate evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that home sovereign bias may 
depend not only on market familiarity of asset managers but also on mandate constraints, suggesting that an important aspect may have been 
overlooked in literature so far.  
 
3. Empirical analysis   
Using the dependent variables described in paragraph 2, we first perform a panel analysis, over the time-period 
2008-2014, on the whole sample of 70 pension funds and 230 investment lines. 
As baseline equation (1), we consider a set of explanatory variables related to the features of the investment 
mandates, the characteristics of the management team, fund-specific controls and investment lines, and time 
fixed effects.  
Y = F(Inv_areait, Guaranteeit, No_managersit, Relevance_foreing_managersit, Fund_typeit, Navit, 
Net_contributionit, Benefitsit, Investment-Linei, Yeart)              (1) 
In equation (2) we simply test the role of foreign managers, no longer considering the share of their assets under 
management to the total AUM (Relevance_foreing_managers), as in the baseline model, but computing how 
many foreign investment firms are included in the fund management team (No_foreign_managers).  
In Equation (3) we test results stability by dropping from the previous model investment lines and time fixed 
effects.  
Table 8 reports our results and shows that the two main factors that affect the sovereign bond holding are a more 
rigid mandate in terms of minimum guaranteed return and the presence of foreign managers. They are significant 
in all model specifications and for both dependent variables.  
 
Table 8. Result of the analysis  
  Y(1) Y(2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Inv_area -0.046 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 
  (1.80)* (1.86)* (1.93)* (1.86)* (1.88)* (1.86)* 
Guarantee 0.116 0.112 0.113 0.116 0.113 0.119 
  (2.63)*** (2.69)*** (3.15)*** (2.60)*** (2.63)*** (3.27)*** 
No_managers -0.026 -0.021 -0.025 -0.027 -0.021 -0.025 
  (1.51) (1.58) (1.86)* (1.97)** (2.13)** (2.63)*** 
No_foreign_managers  -0.001 -0.001   -0.001 -0.001 
   (4.47)*** (5.37)***   (4.51)*** (5.40)*** 
Relevance_foreign_managers -0.001   -0.001   
  (4.77)***   (4.90)***   
Fund_type -0.027 -0.016 0.030 -0.027 -0.016 0.022 
  (0.63) (0.42) (0.8) (0.67) (0.45) (0.62) 
Nav 0.018 0.018 -0.002 0.019 0.019 0.004 
  (2.05)** (2.21)** -0.280 (1.87)* (1.99)** -0.430 
Net_contribution -0.070 -0.073 -0.034 -0.071 -0.074 -0.049 
  (2.66)*** (2.95)*** -1.470 (2.24)** (2.47)** (1.65)* 
Benefits 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 
  (0.01) (0.1) (0.45) (0.01) (0.11) (0.52) 
Intercept 0.414 0.411 0.633 0.201 0.199 0.353 
  (2.76)*** (2.94)*** (5.15)*** (1.19) (1.24) (2.54)** 
Line-FE YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Time FE YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.160 0.160 0.118 0.158 0.156 0.126 
Observatios 1221 1331 1363 1220 1330 1362 
Note. Panel analysis with Y1 (Share of Italian sovereign bonds on UE sovereign exposure), Y2 (Y(1) - Share of Italian debt on total UE area 
sovereign debt. Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors for specifications (4), (5), (6). * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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More in details, the weight of Italian sovereign bonds increases by 11 per cent, if the fund provides a minimum 
return guarantee, while decreases when foreign managers count more. This evidence is in line with the study of 
Lippi (2016). However, we note that the dimension of this reduction is quite small. In fact, a 1 per cent increase 
in the share of AUM allocated to foreign managers generates roughly a 0.1 per cent reduction in the asset 
invested in Italian sovereign bonds. Thus, we conclude that, as far as the exposure of domestic credit risk is 
concerned, the influence of foreign managers is not incisive, except for the case they manage a relevant share of 
fund’s assets.  
The variable Inv_area, shows that extending the investment spectrum outside Europe leads to a 4.5 per cent 
decrease in the share of assets allocated to domestic sovereign bonds, even if the statistical significance of the 
relation is quite weak.  
We then observe that funds with larger sizes are more overexposed towards their national debt, while funds with 
more substantial net contributions, that means cash flows to be invested, diversify more their asset allocation 
reducing the weight of the Italian sovereign bonds in their portfolios. These evidences are coherent with the role 
played by institutional investors in supporting public financing demand and, at the same time, with their need of 
risk diversification. 
A second step of the analysis consists in investigating in depth the guaranteed lines since the presence of a 
guarantee commitment is the more significant factor that increases the share of domestic sovereign bonds in the 
European sovereign portfolio. On a sub-sample of 81 guaranteed-investment lines belonging to 70 funds, we 
estimate equation (4), which adds to equation (1) controls for the guarantee commitment. Firstly, we test the 
influence of the type of guarantee provided between a capital guarantee and a higher minimum guaranteed return 
(Guarantee_type). Secondly, we investigate the influence of the dummy Discretional_choice, which is equal to 
one, if the guarantee also applies when the adherent exercises his discretionary option of leaving the guaranteed 
line, i.e. changing risk-profile inside the same fund or moving to another pension fund. 
Outcomes in Table 9 show that both guarantee-specific controls are significant. A guarantee commitment higher 
than the zero nominal rate increases the domestic sovereign bias by 6 per cent. It is worth noting that more than 
half of the guaranteed lines offers a minimum guaranteed return higher than the capital guarantee. Conversely, 
the extension of the guarantee obligation to circumstances that entail a discretional exit from the fund by 
adherents reduces the share of Italian bonds by 6.6 per cent. Actually, it is likely that in this case a greater cash 
flow instability induces managers to keep a higher share of deposits and other liquid assets, such as sovereign 
bonds of high-rated issuers. It is interesting to notice that reducing the sample to the guarantee lines that have a 
stronger commitment to portfolio returns, the geographic limits of investment mandates acquire explicative 
power. Enlarging the opportunity set helps funds manager to go shopping for yields in different countries and 
asset classes, and thus better diversify their portfolios.  
We finally observe the same influence of foreign managers we have found for the whole sample (Table 8). A one 
per cent increase in the share of assets managed by foreign managers reduces by 0.1 per cent the weight of 
Italian sovereign bonds in portfolio.  
 
Table 9. Results of the analysis on guaranteed lines 
 Guaranteed lines 
  Y1 Y2 
  -1 -2 
Inv_area -0.061 -0.06 
  (2.36)** (2.34)** 
Guarantee_type 0.067 0.066 
  (1.90)* (1.86)* 
Discretional_choice -0.069 -0.068 
  (1.87)* (1.84)* 
No_managers -0.108 -0.108 
  (1.55) (1.55) 
Relevance_foreign managers -0.001 -0.001 
  (2.52)** (2.49)** 
Fund_type -0.022 -0.021 
  (0.36) (0.35) 
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Nav 0.011 0.011 
  (0.73) (0.75) 
Net_contribution -0.152 -0.154 
  (3.13)*** (3.13)*** 
Benefits 0.003 0.003 
  (0.61) (0.62) 
Intercept 0.747 0.532 
  (3.20)*** (2.28)** 
Line FE YES YES 
Time FE YES YES 
Prob>Chi2 0 0 
R-squared 0.151 0.144 
Observations 475 474 
Note. Panel analyses with Y1 (Share of Italian sovereign bonds on UE sovereign exposure), Y2 (Y(1) - Share of Italian debt on total UE area 
sovereign debt). In column (1), (2), Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01. 
 
In summary, the sovereign home bias in Italian pension funds is mainly due to the rigidity of the investment 
mandate to asset managers, in particular to the presence of minimum guarantee return and the available 
investment area. The foreign nationality of the investment team helps to lighten the weight of Italian debt 
holdings, but the effect is smaller than expected. The structural features of the funds, instead, do not strongly 
influence the overexposure towards domestic sovereign bonds, with the partial exception of the size of the fund. 
4. Conclusion 
The paper investigates the determinants of Italian pension funds’ exposure to the domestic sovereign bonds 
during the period 2008-2014. The analysis focuses on a sample of 70 funds, which represents more than 70 per 
cent of the market in terms of NAV. In order to avoid endogeneity problems, we compute our dependent 
variables adopting two alternative methods that allow a proper evaluation of the exposure toward Italian 
sovereign bonds among funds with different risk-profiles. To this end, we consider the share of Italian sovereign 
bonds over the European sovereign portfolio and we compare this measure with the weight of Italian sovereign 
bond in a risk-neutral portfolio. This way, we obtain a measure of sovereign home-bias that we apply in a panel 
analysis.  
We investigate the drivers on sovereign home bias along two main explicative arrows: the familiarity or 
information theory, which focus on the greater knowledge investment firms have of their domestic markets, and 
the opportunity set theory, which focus on the degrees of freedom characterising the investment mandate and in 
the consequent richness of alternatives available for the portfolio managers.  
The empirical work is focused on the Italian pension funds sector which is interesting for the combination of a 
large and liquid domestic sovereign bonds market coupled to a relevant level of return premium over risk-free 
benchmarks. The familiarity of investment managers and the restriction to the opportunity set could in this 
peculiar environment particularly boost the exposure to home sovereign risks, decreasing portfolio 
diversification.  
Results indicate that both factors are significant in explaining the extent of domestic bias. However, from a 
quantitative point of view, the main determinant of an increase in the weight of Italian sovereign bonds is the 
presence of restrictions in the investment mandate. The existence of a minimum guaranteed return determines on 
average an 11 per cent increase in the share of the European sovereign portfolio allocated to Italian bonds. Those 
guaranteed lines offering a commitment greater than the zero nominal rate show, on average, a share of 
sovereign portfolio invested in domestic treasury bonds 7 per cent higher than that of lines providing only a 
capital guarantee. Extending the investment spectrum outside Europe the share of Italian sovereign bond 
decreases by 4.5 per cent on average, but the benefits are greater for guaranteed lines (a 6 per cent reduction). 
In line with previous empirical literature on home bias, which however does not investigate the specific issue of 
the domestic-sovereign-bias, we find evidence of a lower concentration of the Italian sovereign risk as the share 
of AUM to foreign managers increases. However, the intensity of this association does not appear incisive. 
This paper contributes to shed some light on the sovereign risk-exposure of financial institutions that have 
received far less attention than banks, such as pension funds. Since pension funds evaluate their assets at market 
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price, large price movements in domestic sovereign bonds may have a substantial impact on their performance 
and on the benefits offered to adherents. Solvency problems are also likely to occur for pension funds that offer 
minimum return guarantees. Our empirical analysis suggests that the level of sovereign risk exposure, which 
characterises Italian pension funds, is not only a matter of experience, familiarity or geographical proximity of 
the management team, since it appears related to the perimeter of the investment mandate. Adherents should be 
aware and properly informed about such concentration risk especially when they decide to join low-risk 
investment lines that offer capital protection and/or minimum return. Regulators should better address the effects 
of investment mandate restrictions on the stability of the Italian pension fund industry, considering that such a 
large sovereign home bias could eventually undermine the adherents’ private pension payments in case the 
worsening of the country’s financial conditions affects the public pension system. 
This finding suggests that exposure to the domestic-sovereign risk of Italian pension funds would probably 
reduce after specific mandate restrictions have loosened and international competition among assed management 
firms increased. Based on our results, a useful stream for future research could be an in depth investigation of the 
relationship between mandate restrictions and asset allocation biases in the mutual fund industry. 
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